Privacy Policy

We cannot read your notes.

No accounts, no analytics, and every note sealed on your device before it goes anywhere. We do run a server — this page says exactly what it can and cannot see, including what it learns without reading anything.

Last updated 25 October 2026

This policy covers the Naastenka apps for iPhone and Android, published by Sidekala Oy (“we”), and the website at naastenka.sideka.la. Questions go to naastenka@sideka.la.

What we collect

No personal data. The app contains no analytics, no crash reporting, no advertising identifier and no third-party SDKs of any kind. There is no account to make and nothing to sign in to. We do not know who you are, how often you open it, or what you write in it.

Apple gives every developer aggregate App Store statistics — downloads per country, and similar. Those are Apple’s figures, counted by Apple, and they never identify anybody.

The apps come with two servers, so that a board can be made without anybody setting up a machine first: api.naastenka.sideka.la and naastenka.www.cavoj.net. We operate both. What they hold is described below. They cannot read a note, and neither can we.

What stays on your device

Naastenka keeps, in its own app container on your iPhone or Android phone:

  • This device’s key — made the first time the app talks to a server, and kept where the hardware allows it to be used but never copied: the Secure Enclave on an iPhone, the secure hardware Android provides. Its private half never leaves the device. It signs every request the app makes, which is how the server tells an invited device from a stranger. It does not identify you; it identifies this installation.
  • Each board’s keys — a 64-byte key that decrypts everything on the board, and the board’s signing key. They arrive sealed to this device when somebody invites you, and they are the only things that can open the board. They, the invite secrets and the notes this device has opened are kept out of the phone’s backups and are not moved to a new phone, so a backup holds nothing that could read a board.
  • The name you sign notes with, and which server the board is on. The name is inside your encrypted note; it does not travel in the clear.
  • The notes it last fetched, decrypted, so a widget has something to draw before it has managed to reconnect.

This lives in the app’s private storage (on Apple platforms, an App Group container shared with its widget), with the protection the operating system gives every app’s private storage. It is not backed up to anything of ours, not synced by us between your devices, and none of it is ever sent to us. Deleting the app deletes all of it — including the board keys, which nobody can reissue: you would need a fresh invite.

What leaves your device, and where it goes

When you write a note or react to one, the app encrypts it on your device with the board’s key and sends the result to the board’s server over HTTPS. The server receives a blob it has no key for. This is end-to-end encryption in the ordinary sense: only the people holding the board’s key can read what is on it.

Every request also carries a signature from this device’s key, and requests about a board one from the board’s key. That is how the server knows to answer only devices that were invited — not who they belong to.

Each board lives on one server, picked when the board is asked for: one of the two we operate, api.naastenka.sideka.la (the default) or naastenka.www.cavoj.net, or one you add yourself, including your own machine. Because the encryption happens before anything is sent, whose server it is does not decide who can read the board.

What the server can see

This is the honest list, and it is the same for any server running Naastenka:

  • Each device’s public key, and the random id the server gave it. Not a name, not a phone number, not an account.
  • Which devices are on which board. The server keeps that list — it is how it refuses everybody else — so it knows that the same few devices share a board, and, while an invite is open, which device invited which. It does not know who is behind a device.
  • Encrypted notes and reactions, padded to a multiple of 256 bytes so their length says only roughly how big they are, and when each one changed. They are filed under codes derived from the writer’s name and the board’s key, so the server does not see the names on a board, and cannot tell a note from a reaction. It does see how many there are — about two for each person who writes.
  • The board’s settings, encrypted — its name and its list of reactions. The server holds them and cannot read them.
  • When a board was asked for, by which device, and from which IP address. The server stores these with the board until the board is deleted, and writes the board’s id and the IP address to its system log, which keeps entries for seven days. New boards are approved by a person at the server before they work; that person sees only this, never the board’s name.
  • A push token, for an iPhone with a Naastenka widget (iOS 26 and later). Apple gives the widget a token that lets a server ask Apple to wake it, and the app hands that token to the server of each board it is on — so the server knows which boards would wake which phone. When somebody writes on a board, the server sends Apple a silent push for every other iPhone on it. The push carries nothing: no board, no note, no name, no count. Apple sees only that the app’s widget should refresh, and the widget then fetches the board from the server itself. It never shows anything on screen. The Android app sends no push token.
  • Your IP address and the timing of every request, as with any internet connection. To enforce its limits the server counts requests per address and per device; the counters are kept in memory only and are gone when it restarts. Our servers keep no log of requests, and the web server in front of them has access logging turned off; the board requests above are the only thing they log.

It cannot read a note, and it cannot move one to another name or another board — the encryption binds each note to both, so a shuffled note simply fails to open and the app drops it. The protocol page sets out what it can still do: stay quiet about a note it was given, and hand an old one to a device that never saw the newer.

Inside a board there are no per-person signatures. Anybody on a board can write on it under any name, including yours. That is deliberate: a board is shared with people you already trust, and the app does not pretend otherwise. If that is not the relationship you have with somebody, do not invite them.

How long the server keeps things

  • The one-time code on each request, which stops it being replayed: ten minutes.
  • An invite: a day if nobody uses it, a week once it has been confirmed, and no longer than it takes one of you to end it or the receiver to collect the board.
  • A board nobody approves: 30 days. A board nobody is on any more: it is deleted.
  • A push token: until Apple says it is no longer valid (the app was deleted, say), or 60 days after the app last renewed it — which it does when it is opened.
  • A device’s public key and id: until you ask us to delete it.

Permissions the app asks for

  • Local Network (iPhone) — only if you point a board at a server on your own network. The two built-in servers are ordinary internet hosts and do not need it. It is never used to discover devices or scan anything.
  • Camera (iPhone) — only while you are pointing it at an invite’s QR code. No photo is saved, and nothing from the camera leaves the device.

The app never asks for permission to send notifications, because it sends none. The silent push that refreshes an iPhone widget needs no permission and shows nothing.

Sharing a board

An invite link or QR code does not contain the board’s key. It works once, for a day. When somebody opens it, both of your apps show the same four words; you compare them — out loud, or anywhere you trust — and only when you confirm does your app seal the board’s keys to their device. Somebody who intercepts the link gets nowhere: their words will not match, and you decline.

The link’s secret sits in its fragment — the part after the # — which browsers never send to a web server. So even the https://naastenka.sideka.la/b#… form of an invite, opened in a browser, tells this website nothing about which board it is.

There is no way to remove somebody from a board. Keys cannot be un-given. If somebody should not be on a board any more, the answer is a new board that they are not invited to.

Children

Naastenka is not directed at children and has nothing in it aimed at them. We ask for no personal data from anybody, so we do not knowingly hold any from a child either — and could not identify one if we did.

Your rights

Under the GDPR and comparable laws you have rights of access, rectification, erasure and portability over personal data a company holds about you. Where a board is on one of our two servers, what we hold is device keys, the list of which devices are on which board, an iPhone’s push token, the IP address each board was asked for from, and ciphertext we cannot open — so we can delete a board on request but cannot produce its contents, because we do not have them and no amount of law can conjure a key we were never given. Where a board is on a server you added yourself, the operator of that server is the controller. Write to naastenka@sideka.la either way and we will answer in writing.

Changes

If this policy changes, the date at the top changes with it and the previous wording stops applying from that date. Anything that would make the app collect information it does not collect today would be announced here first, and in the app’s release notes.

Contact

Sidekala Oy · naastenka@sideka.la · sideka.la